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The added worker effect states that unemployment of a household member leads to an 
increase in labour supply of another household member.  This paper investigates 
whether there is such an effect in a developing country.  We use a rich data set for 
urban Ethiopia.   
 
We first give a brief description of who is unemployed within the household and find 
that they are mostly related to the household head.  Men are not more likely to be 
unemployed than women once we control for being family in law. The eldest remaining 
sons in the household are more likely to be unemployed, but this may be due to a 
selection bias.  The oldest remaining unemployed have no higher job aspirations than 
their younger brothers, suggesting that if older brothers have more entitlements, waiting 
in unemployment for a good job is not one of them.   
 
We carry out two separate analyses to investigate the added worker effect.  First we 
analyse the effect using actual labour supply and find no evidence for an added worker 
effect once we take unobserved individual effects into account. We then investigate 
whether there is an added worker effect using desired labour market participation and 
find that there is none.  The combined evidence indicates that there is no added worker 
effect.  This suggests that households have other ways to cope with unemployment and 
is consistent with results from previous analysis which shows that the use of savings 
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1.  Introduction 
 
With around fifty percent of the urban young men unemployed, Ethiopia has one of the 
highest unemployment rates worldwide.  Unemployment is concentrated among young, 
relatively well educated, first time job seekers, who come from middle class families.  
Almost two thirds of them are looking for a well paid formal sector, mostly public 
sector job.  Mean duration of unemployment is close to four years after correcting for 
censoring.  It is longer for those aspiring to a public sector job.
2  How do people cope 
with these long periods of unemployment?  Since there are no state benefits in Ethiopia, 
the unemployed have to rely on other (informal) insurance mechanisms.  The household 
is likely to fulfil this role, especially when unemployment is concentrated among young 
first time job seekers.  How do the households cope with an unemployed member?  It 
can follow one or more of the following strategies:  use its savings, borrow funds, sell 
its assets, lower consumption or supply more labour to increase income.  The latter is 
known as the added worker effect.  More formally, the added worker effect is defined 
as the increase in the labour supply of one household member as a consequence of the 
unemployment of another member.  Traditionally the focus is on unemployment of the 
primary worker - whose earnings are the main source of income for the household - and 
the implications for labour supply of the secondary worker.  Hence the added worker 
effect is interpreted as an insurance mechanism.   When the labour market has two 
sectors, one with ‘good’ and one with ‘bad’ jobs, the added labour will most likely be 
supplied in the bad sector, because the good sector is rationed.  This paper looks at the 
added worker effect from women with regard to the unemployment of men. There are 
two reasons why we restrict ourselves to women.  Firstly, the norm in Ethiopia is that 
                                                 
2 For a detailed analysis of the nature of unemployment in urban Ethiopia, see Serneels (2003).   4
men engage in market labour; they are the primary workers.
 3 Their labour supply is 
therefore not so much driven by the number of unemployed in the household.
 4  This is 
not to say that there are no women who are primary workers, but in general men play 
this role.  Secondly we want to examine the intra household consequences of the kind 
of unemployment observed in urban Ethiopia.   
 
The literature on the added worker effect is mostly empirical and concentrates on the 
effect of the husband’s unemployment on his wife’s labour supply [see Mincer (1962), 
Fleisher and Rhodes (1976), Ashenfelter (1980), Layard et al (1980), Bardhan (1984), 
Lundberg (1985), Maloney (1987, 1991), and Tano (1993)].  The evidence suggests 
that the effect is small.  Women do not move into the labour market when their husband 
is unemployed.  The usual explanation is that the added worker effect is offset by a 
discouraged worker effect.  The fact that the husband becomes unemployed sends a 
signal of poor job perspectives, which discourages the wife from beginning to look for 
a job [see Humphrey (1940), Layard et al (1980), Bardhan (1984), Maloney (1991)].  
Recent theoretical work by Basu, Genicot and Stiglitz (1998) questions this explanation 
and argues that the added worker effect may appear to be small while in fact it is large.  
Most studies look at the wife’s actual labour supply, while it would be more accurate to 
consider her desired labour supply.   They argue that the other household members may 
not manage to get a job, but are actually looking for one.  Maloney (1987) provides 
evidence that this is indeed the case: taking underemployment into account; he finds 
that the added worker effect is significant. Lundberg (1985) and Tano (1993) study the 
transition from outside the labour force into labour force participation, which includes 
unemployment, and also find a significant added worker effect.  
 
                                                 
3  A good indication for this is that the wages of men are much higher than those of women. 
4 We actually carried out the analysis for men, and find that there are only negative significant effects of 
the number of unemployed on male labour supply.      5
The empirical literature on the added worker effect focuses almost exclusively on 
OECD countries.  Nevertheless, the effect seems more relevant for developing 
countries, where formal insurance against unemployment is absent.  Gruber and Cullen 
(1996) argue precisely that the added worker effect in the US is weak because 
unemployment benefits offer adequate insurance.  They find that benefits crowd out at 
least a fraction of the added worker effect.   We know of only one publication that 
investigates the added worker effect in a developing country.  Bardhan (1984) finds a 
strong negative effect of the male household unemployment rate on female labour 
supply in rural West Bengal, India.  He concludes that the job search discouragement 
effect outweighs the income effect related to the unemployment of men in the 
household.   Other work on labour markets in developing countries provides strong 
evidence that household income has an important effect on female labour supply [see 
Xiadong and van Soest (2002) for urban Mexico, Serneels (1998) for urban Ethiopia, 
Awudu and Prasad (2000) for Nepal].  This suggests that if unemployment in the 
household has a negative effect or no effect on female labour supply, there is a 
substantial discouragement effect to compensate for the income effect.  Indirect 
evidence for this is offered by Khandker (1988), who observes that if women in rural 
Bangladesh do not participate in market labour, this is at least in part due to a lack of 
job opportunities.   Gluck and Sahn (2001), using a multi-period multinomial logit, 
observe for Conakry that the husband’s employment status affects the wife’s 
occupational choice. Those with an unemployed husband are more likely to be working 
in self employment.  This may suggest that women with an unemployed husband enter 
a ‘bad’ job to supply additional labour.  
 
This paper is structured as follows.  In section two we consider the theoretical 
framework and identify a reduced form equation.  We discuss the data in section three. 
Section four describes who is unemployed within the household.  It gives additional   6
information to what we already know about male unemployment in urban Ethioipia.
5  
In section five we test the presence of an added worker effect using actual labour 
supply, while in section six we examine the presence of an added worker effect using 
desired labour market participation.  In section seven we explore why we do not 
observe an added worker effect.  Section eight discusses the limitations of the analysis.  
We summarize our findings in the conclusion.   
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
 
We study the added worker effect within the framework of household labour supply.  
We base our theoretical model on the model developed by Ashenfelter (1980).  Its starts 
from the familiar setting where a household maximizes utility, which is a function of 
the leisure and consumption of the respective household members, subject to a budget 
constraint, a time constraint and a non-negativity condition.  An additional constraint 
variable  i H  is introduced to reflect that desired labour supply may exceed a fixed level.  
If the constraint is binding, actual hours of work will equal the constraint level  i H .  
() max ,
i
ii L ULC                     1,.., in =           (1.1) 
subject to: 







= + ∑∑                      (1.2) 
   (2)  ii LTH =−                              (1.3) 
   (3)  ii HH ≤                          (1.4) 
   (3)    0; 0; 0 ii i HHC ≥≥≥                          (1.5) 
                                                 
5 Namely that it is concentrated among first time job seekers who aspire to a public sector job  [see 
Serneels (2002)].     7
where  i L  is leisure, which is the sum of non-market labour and free time; and  i C  is the 
individual’s consumption.    i H  is the individual’s market labour supply and  i w  his or 
her wage. y reflects non-labour household income.  Both  i w  and y are exogenous.  The 
individual chooses  i H   to maximize  i U .  We assume that all income is consumed, so 
the constraint expressed by equation (1.2) is binding. Therefore  i C  is fully determined 
once  i H   is chosen.  An individual’s labour supply can then be written as a function of 
her (shadow) wage, household income, the labour supply constraint of the other 
household members and the labour income from the other household members: 
() ,, , ii j j j Hf w y H w H =   1,.., ; in i j = ≠                (1.6) 
We now introduce a variable ( ) j u  for each of the other household members.  The 
variable is a function of that member’s labour supply constraint and labour income: 
() , jj j j ug H w H =                        (1.7) 
 
More specifically, we let it be a logical variable which takes the value one when the 
constraint is binding and zero otherwise.   







uH H o r H H
 =⇔ = = 

=⇔ > ≥ = >  
                 (1.9) 
 
When the constraint is binding and equal to zero, the individual is unemployed; 
otherwise she is not.  Note that the individual can choose not to work, which may be 
optimal when income from other sources is large.  When she is unemployed, her   8
income from labour is zero () 0 jj wH = , otherwise it is positive ( ) 0 jj wH > .   We can 
now rewrite equation (1.6) as follows: 
    () , , 1,.., ; ii j Hf w y u j n i j == ≠                            (1.10) 
() 1 ,,. . ii n Hf w y u u =                                               (1.11) 
 
In the simple context where only a husband and a wife are working, n equals two and 
the model examines the effect of the husband’s employment status on the wife’s labour 
supply.  To generalize this to a context where other household members also participate 
in the labour market, we increase n.  We will consider four groups of unemployed: 
young men, adult men, young women, and adult women.  A last adaptation has to be 
made to include corner solutions.  Equation (1.11) only holds when the wage exceeds 
the reservation wage; otherwise, labour supply will be zero.  The model thus becomes: 
( ) 1 ,,. .
0
r
ii n i i
i
Hf w y u ui f w w
Ho t h e r w i s e
 =>

=   
               (1.12) 
 
This will be the key equation for our empirical estimation.  We will carry out two 
separate sets of analysis.  In Section five we estimate the added worker effect using 
actual labour supply; while in Section six , we estimate the added worker effect using 
desired labour market participation.     
 
3.  Data Description 
 
We use household panel data for urban Ethiopia.  The data is collected by Addis Ababa 
University in co-operation with Göteborg University and the Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, University of Oxford.  The survey sampled 1500 households in the 
seven largest towns in Ethiopia in 1994 and 2000, giving rise to a panel of 1422   9
households.  The household attrition rate of five percent is mostly due to migration.  
Individual attrition is higher because people leave the household.   Table 1 summarises 
the average household composition.  It has six members; four to five of them of them 
belong to the nuclear family. The partner of the head of the household is often not 
living in the household; this occurs mostly in female headed households, which 
represent forty-four percent of the sample.
6  There are on average three children in a 
household, but there is substantial variation. Other household members are brothers, 
sisters, grandchildren, nieces, nephews and other relatives from the household head.  
The household contains systematically more relatives than relatives-in-law from the 
household head. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Average household composition 
Relation to Household head  Average 
number 
Sd minimum  maximum 
Household head  1  0.06  0  1 
Wife, Husband or Partner  0.53  0.51  0  3 
Son or Daughter  3.10  2.36  0  13 
Step-Son or Step-Daughter  0.08  0.41  0  6 
Grandchild 0.22  0.74  0  9 
Father or Mother  0.04  0.22  0  2 
Sister/Brother 0.21  0.68  0  7 
Niece or Nephew  0.18  0.60  0  7 
Uncle or Aunt  0.03  0.26  0  5 
Son or Daughter-In-Law  0.04  0.21  0  3 
Father or Mother-In-Law  0.01  0.10  0  1 
Brother or Sister-In-Law  0.04  0.24  0  4 
Grandparent 0.03  0.25  0  5 
Other Relative to Head or His/Her Spouse  0.22  0.63  0  7 
Servant 0.14  0.45  0  6 
Tenant or Boarder  0.002  0.05  0  1 
Other Unrelated Person  0.06  0.37  0  9 
Household size  5.92  2.74  1  19 
   
 
Table 2 gives the distribution of the labour force according to household position, 
excluding the handicapped, pensioners and those too old to work.  Four fifths of the 
labour force lives with their close relatives.    Children represent the largest group, 
                                                 
6 This is 9% higher than what the census reports for urban areas; most likely because our sample is 
restricted to the seven largest cities.   10
followed by household heads and partners.  This underlines the importance of including 
them when investigating the added worker effect.  
 
  Table 2: Distribution of the labour force according to household position 
7 














Other Relative to Head or His/Her Spouse  3.68 
Servant 3.11 
Tenant/Boarder 0.05 




Note that our two points of observations, 1994 and 2000 are quite far apart in time. 




It is important to note that we restrict ourselves to market labour supply, which 
excludes household female business activities, like making or selling self prepared 
food, drinks, fuel, pottery and handicrafts or selling small quantities of second hand 
clothes.  These activities are mostly carried out at home and are difficult to distinguish 
from housework.  We consider agricultural work, the only other productive activity 
carried out outside the labour market, also as housework, because we only analyse 
                                                 
7 Labour Force is all members older than 15 excluding students, pensioners, handicapped and those too 
old to work.  
8 As a matter of fact we tried with a shorter panel that was only two years apart, but because of the long 
duration, not many young unemployed had changed status.    11
urban households.  Agricultural labour represents only one percent of urban 
professional activities.  
 
A unique feature about the data is that it contains information on the desire to work.  
Respondents were asked for their main activity, which was classified in one of the more 
than twenty categories, including household work and unemployment.  When an 
individual described himself as unemployed, he was asked whether he was looking for 
work or not.  This enables us to distinguish between those who are actively looking for 
a job and those who are not.  We consider those who are looking for work as having a 
desire to work and thus participating in the labour force, while those who are not 
looking for work are classified as not participating in the labour market.  Those who 
carry out housework are also considered not to be participating in the labour market.     
 
Whether the unemployed who are not looking for work should be considered as 
unemployed at all, is a discussion that goes back a long way and is treated in more 
detail in Flinn and Heckman (1983). We can roughly distinguish two competing views, 
which are in other places called the broad and narrow definitions of unemployment [see 
Knight and Kingdon (2001)]. The first one defines unemployment as all those who 
would take a job when they are offered one; the second defines the unemployed as 
those who actively search for a job.  Those who use the broad rather than narrow 
definition argue that individuals who are not looking for work still have a desire to 
work, but are just discouraged to search actively, because of the high prevalence of 
unemployment.  In this paper we use the conservative, narrow, definition.  However, 
the difference between the broad and narrow definitions of unemployment is extremely 
small in our data: only six percent of the unemployed are not looking for work.  Not 
surprisingly, we find that our results are robust, whichever definition we use.  
   12
 
4.  Who is unemployed within the household? 
 
This section examines who is unemployed within the household, and what their 
position is.  We carry out a probit analysis using the 2000 cross section data.
9   Table 3 
reports the results in marginal effects and confirms the findings from earlier work that 
the young relatively highly educated, those with junior or secondary education, are 
more likely to be unemployed [see Serneels (2002)].  Gender also has an effect: men 
are more likely to be unemployed, but this becomes insignificant when we control for 
whether the individual belongs to the family-in-law.  Relatives-in-law are less likely to 
be unemployed. This is a robust finding throughout our analysis and suggests that 
Ethiopian households do not adopt unemployed family- in-law.  When we introduce an 
interaction term between gender and family-in-law, we find that men who belong to the 
family-in-law are more likely to be unemployed, although the effect is only significant 
at the twelve percent level.  This suggests that only male unemployed relatives-in-law 
are adopted by the household.  In other words, female relatives-in-law are only 
accepted when they are not unemployed and thus have a job or carry out housework.  
This is consistent with the finding for rural Ethiopia, that daughters-in-law, when 
present in the household, work harder (Fafchamps and Quisimbing 2000). We also find 
that relatives of the first degree
10  are ten percent more likely to be unemployed, which 
confirms that the nuclear household does not adopt other unemployed members.  Since 
this is urban data, it also suggests that job related migration from rural to urban areas, 
which is believed to depend on social and family networks [see Granovetter (1994)], 
takes place after a job has been found.   
 
                                                 
9 The findings hold for the 1994 data as well. 
10 Relatives of the first degree to the household head are children, parents and siblings, but not the partner   13
  Table 3: Probit  individual unemployment of all household members (marginal effects) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age of the household member  -0.017960  -0.015746  -0.015631 
 (0.002338)**  (0.002380)**  (0.002383)** 
Age squared  0.000150  0.000124  0.000123 
 (0.000028)**  (0.000029)**  (0.000029)** 
Male 0.033441  0.017929  0.013523 
 (0.013839)*  (0.013737)  (0.013788) 
Highest level of education is primary  0.011416  0.013343  0.013627 
 (0.022953)  (0.022616)  (0.022598) 
Highest level of education is junior secondary  0.066193  0.063453  0.062086 
 (0.025284)**  (0.024857)*  (0.024762)* 
Highest level of education is senior secondary  0.053397  0.052515  0.052575 
 (0.020461)**  (0.020091)**  (0.020016)** 
Highest level of education is tertiary  -0.159096  -0.155295  -0.154691 
 (0.013580)**  (0.013146)**  (0.013083)** 
Mean value of assets per household member  -0.000009  -0.000010  -0.000009 
 (0.000004)*  (0.000004)*  (0.000004)* 
First degree relative: child, parent, sibling (not partner)  0.143347  0.120345  0.120363 
 (0.025078)**  (0.024401)**  (0.024342)** 
Eldest of remaining children and grandchildren  0.080897  0.068804  0.069139 
 (0.024405)**  (0.023459)**  (0.023408)** 
Ethnicity same as household head  0.034187  0.016278  0.016593 
 (0.021659)  (0.023675)  (0.023594) 
Religion same as household head  0.014180  0.017753  0.018764 
 (0.029754)  (0.029237)  (0.028996) 
Relatives-in-law: partner, child in law, parent in law*    -0.111304  -0.121786 
   (0.018114)**  (0.018566)** 
Male x relative in law       0.111778 
     (0.082390) 
Observations 4026  4026  4026 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
   
 
 
To investigate birth order effects, we develop a variable for birth order. The variable 
reflects the birth order of the members remaining in the household, since that is the 
only information we have. Its coefficient is highly significant; being the eldest of the 
remaining children and grandchildren gives a seven percent higher probability of being 
in unemployed. Does this mean that birth order gives an entitlement to unemployment, 
just as it has been observed to lead to higher education and earnings (Behrman and 
Taubman 1986)?  Not necessarily.  Because we only measure birth order for those 
remaining in the household, our results suffer from a selectivity bias: those who have 
left the household and who are also more likely to be employed, are excluded from our 
analysis.   Our result may just reflect that elder children stay in their parental home 
when they are unemployed, while younger children stay with their parents even when 
they have a job, because they are too young to start their own household.  In the context 
of a dual labour market the entitlement to unemployment may be an entitlement to wait   14
for a good job.  To further investigate whether birth order affects this kind of 
entitlement, we analyse whether older individuals have different job aspirations than 
their younger siblings.  Table 4 shows that the evidence is weak.   
 
Table 4: Birth order and job aspirations of the eldest versus the youngest child 

















Looking for a ‘good’ job
11  46%  49% 55% 48% 
Looking for ‘any work’ or ‘bad’ job   54%  51%  45%  52% 
  100% 100%  100% 100% 
 
 
Elder sons have only slightly higher aspirations than their younger brothers, and the 
difference is not significant.  So if the elder men are more entitled to unemployment, 
this is not an entitlement to wait for a good job.  For women, we get the opposite result: 
elder remaining daughters have lower job aspirations than their younger sisters.  Does 
this confirm the common impression that elder daughters have to help more in the 
household, thereby sacrificing their own career prospects?  Not necessarily, because 
there is again a selection bias.  The result may just reflect that women with the lowest 
employment probabilities stay longer in the household.  
 
We find no evidence that having the same ethnicity or religion as the household head 
affects one’s employment status.  In line with the results for 1994, we find that the 
unemployed are more likely to come from households with low consumption and asset 
value per capita. When we replicate the results for the young only, the group we are 
mainly interested in, the results remain the same.  
 
                                                 
11 Civil servant, International Organization employee, public or private sector enterprise employee are 
considered to be ‘good’ jobs, while self-employment, casual worker, co-operative worker, domestic and 
agricultural worker are considered ‘bad’ jobs.   15
We conclude that the unemployed in a household are very likely to be related to the 
household.  We find that birth order has a positive effect on being unemployed, but this 
result may suffer from a selection bias.  However, we do not find that elder sons have 
higher job aspirations than their younger brothers.  So if elder sons are more entitled to 
unemployment, this is not an entitlement to wait for a good job.  Family-in- law of the 
household head who live in the household are unlikely to be unemployed, although men 
are more likely to be unemployed than women.  Finally, we confirm results of the 
analysis on an earlier round of the data that the urban unemployed are more likely to 
come from households with low asset value and consumption per capita.  
 
5.  The added worker effect using actual labour supply 
 
In this section we analyse the added worker effect using actual labour supply.  The 
standard method to estimate equation (1.12) is to apply a tobit latent variable model:  
    ()
*












                             (1.14) 
We can write the linear approximation to equation (1.13) as follows: 
*
01 2 3 1 1 3 .. ii h i n n i Hw y u u v ββ β β β =+ + + + + +                        (1.15) 
 
We consider four categories of household members: young men (age thirty or below), 
adult men, young women and adult women and examine the added work of women 
when a member of any category is unemployed.  Implicitly this means that we consider 
young and adult men to be primary workers, while young and adult women are 
secondary workers.  This is an expansion of the traditional approach where women 
represent the secondary workers and their husband is the primary worker.  The reason is   16
that thirty-seven percent of the urban Ethiopian households are headed by a woman.  In 
ninety percent of these households, there is no partner present.  Only nineteen percent 
of the female household heads are married, indicating that the man is living away and 
has a long term engagement in migrant work.
12   They are likely to receive remittances.  
The other eighty-one percent however, depends mostly on income generated by the 
household members.   
 
We are especially interested in the added worker effect caused by unemployment of 
young and adult men.  The latter for the obvious reason that he is still the primary 
worker ‘par excellence’.  The special interest for young men springs from the 
observation that his earnings are about twice those of young and adult women, which 
makes him a good candidate to replace a missing primary worker.
13 
 
Assuming that the added worker effect is equal for members of the same category, we 
can write  (1.15) as:  
 
*
01 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 ii h y m a m y w a w i Hw y u u u u v ββ β β β β β =+ + + + + + +           (1.16) 
 
We control for two other variables that are known to play a role in female labour supply 
decisions (see Killingsworth and Heckman 1986): the individual’s age and age squared 
and the number of young children
14 in the household.  A simulation shows that our 
results remain the same if we drop these variables, but we prefer to keep them because 
they control for heterogeneity and make the empirical models behave better.  The 
                                                 
12 Other female household heads lost their partner because he died (50%); or because the couple is 
separated or divorced (divorce is accepted in the Ethiopian Christian Orthodox church. Eight percent of 
the women household heads are single and have never been married.   
13 Median earnings for young men are 39 USD 1994 PPP per month; for young women 17 USD;  for 
adult women 15 USD.  Median earnings for adult men are 58 USD.  
14 Under age 6   17
variable wi is not observed for individuals who are not engaged in market labour.  We 
predict their occupation and earnings using an occupation-specific earnings function.  
We do this separately for men and women.  The methodology is described in detail in 
Section 0in the appendix.  The earnings of the self-employed are constructed using a 
Cobb Douglas production function, as described in Section 0in the appendix.   
 
To investigate whether there is an added worker effect, we apply equation (1.16) to 
different parts of the data.  Table 5 gives an overview of the models we estimate.  We 
consider two different equations.  The first equation is the one shown in equation (1.16)
; the second is the difference of equation (1.16):   
 
*
0 123 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 ii h y m a m y w a w i Hw y u u u u v ββ β β β β β ∆=+ ∆ + ∆ +∆+∆+∆+∆+      (1.17) 
 
We estimate each of the equations separately for young and adult women because we 
expect that the labour supply decision is different for these two groups.
15   
                                                 
15 Note also that we work with the age ranges at t1, but we get the same results for all models when we 
use the age ranges at t2; which proves the robustness of our results for the definition of age ranges.    
 
 
Table 5: Overview of the models to estimate the added worker effect using actual labour supply 
Name Model  Part of the data applied to Estimation  method 
(1) balanced panel  *
01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 i it it itym itam ityw itaw i H wyu u u u v ββ β β β β β =+ + + + + + +   :: 1 : 2 it t t t ∀ ∃= ∧ ∃=   Random effects tobit 
(2) panel with attrition  *







Random effect tobit 
(3) rotating panel   *
01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 i it it itym itam ityw itaw i H wyu u u u v ββ β β β β β =+ + + + + + +   :: 1 : 2
:1 2
it t t t
it t
∀ ∃= ∨ ∃=
∧∃ = ∧ =  
 
 Random effects tobit 
(4) cross section 1994  *
01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 i it it itym itam ityw itaw i H wyu u u u v ββ β β β β β =+ + + + + + +   :1 it ∀ =   Censored Least Absolute 
Deviation (CLAD) with 
bootstrapped standard 
errors 
(5) cross section 2000  *
01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 i it it itym itam ityw itaw i H wyu u u u v ββ β β β β β =+ + + + + + +   :2 it ∀ =   Censored Least Absolute 
Deviation (CLAD) with 
bootstrapped standard 
errors 
      
(6) difference model  *
01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 i i i iym iam iyw iaw i H wy u u u u v ββ β β β β β ∆=+ ∆ + ∆ +∆+∆+∆+∆+   :: 1 : 2 it t t t ∀ ∃= ∧ ∃=  
 
OLS with robust standard 
errors 
      
      
Note 1: The balanced panel only contains the individuals coming from households that are present in both rounds; the panel with attrition contains only those individuals 
whose household was present in the first round; while in the rotated panel, the individuals from households who have left in the second round are replaced by individuals 
coming from similar households as those who have left. 
 
Note 2:  For the panel data we prefer the random effects tobit rather than the pooled tobit because all models fail a test for dynamic completeness (Wooldridge 2002).  
Using a conditional moment test developed by Söderbom (2002), we find that the ordinary tobit fails the heteroscedasticity or normality condition for all the models 
applied to the cross section data.  We therefore programmed the non-parametric estimation method Censored Least Absolute Deviation.  When censoring exceeds 50%, 
we use the third quartile rather than the median as point of reference, as suggested by Pagan and Ullah (1999).  The standard errors are obtained using a bootstrapping 
programme from Rogers (1993).  The corrected standard errors are not available for the 1994 cross section data because the bootstrapping did not converge.  However, 
the results are robust with those from trimmed least squares estimation.  The 1994 results thus have to be interpreted with caution.  For model (6) we use OLS and report 
the Hubert White Sandwich standard errors. To estimate equation (1.16), we focus on the results obtained from the balanced panel, 
which are reported in Table 6.   We find no added worker effect: none of the 
coefficients of the number of unemployed is significantly greater than zero.  We also 
find that shadow earnings have the expected sign and are significant.  Household 
welfare, measured by assets, has no significant influence, while the number of young 
children has a negative effect on the labour supply of both young and adult women.  
For young women, age also has a (concave) effect: the older they are, the more labour 
they supply, but at a decreasing rate.  
 
Table 6: Random effects tobit applied to balanced panel data (using actual labour supply) 
  Actual labour supply (hrs/wk) 
 (1)  (2) 
  Young women  Adult women 
Age 12.17998  -0.58189 
 (4.39310)**  (2.64192) 
Age squared  -0.20538  -0.01164 
 (0.08228)*  (0.02925) 
Number of young unemployed men  3.03085  -1.66700 
 (4.90225)  (3.63254) 
Number of adult unemployed men  -3.45601  5.04878 
 (7.04181)  (6.88412) 
Number of (other) young unemployed women  -1.14493  -2.84456 
 (4.20303)  (3.51213) 
Number of (other) adult unemployed women  -0.73586  7.50846 
 (12.90662)  (11.99942) 
Shadow  earnings  0.05602  0.11825 
 (0.00935)**  (0.01323)** 
Value of assets per household member  0.00032  -0.00001 
 (0.00079)  (0.00081) 
Number of children under six  -14.90697  -7.88840 
 (3.69756)**  (4.08587)+ 
Constant -181.35927  4.80032 
 (57.31747)**  (58.30988) 
Observations 514  602 
Number of individuals  257  301 
Standard errors in parentheses     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Because the balanced panel may suffer from a self selection bias, we compare its results 
with those obtained from the panel with attrition, which includes the households that 
only have an observation for the first period.  We find that none of the coefficients are 
significantly different, as can be seen in Table 7.  To check the robustness of our 
estimates further, we examine the results of the rotated panel, where households that   20
have exited were replaced by neighbouring households with a similar composition and 
characteristics.  Again none of the results obtained from the balanced panel are 
contradicted.  But the rotated panel suggests that there is a discouragement effect for 
young women from young unemployed women.   Young women would thus be less 
likely to supply more labour when there are other unemployed young women in the 
household.   
 
  Table 7:  The added worker effect for the level models (using actual labour supply) 
   
  Actual labour supply (hrs/wk) 
 (1)  (2) 
  Young women  Adult women 
    
The number of unemployed young men  in the household     
   Balanced panel  3.03  -1.67 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition  -2.52  -2.75 
   Unbalanced panel rotation   -3.71  -3.70 
   Cross section 1994 
1 -20.22  -3.71 
   Cross section 2000 
2 5.16  0.27 
    
The number of unemployed adult men in the household     
   Balanced panel  -3.46  5.05 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition  11.19  -1.61 
   Unbalanced panel rotation   6.87  0.90 
   Cross section 1994  15.74  1.16 
   Cross section 2000  -4.16  3.10 
    
The number of other unemployed young women in the household     
   Balanced panel  -1.14  -2.84 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition  -6.15  -3.81 
   Unbalanced panel rotation   -10.26**  -4.05 
   Cross section 1994  3.73  0.31 
   Cross section 2000  -4.64  -0.65 
    
The number of other unemployed adult women in the household     
   Balanced panel  -0.74  7.51 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition  4.04  13.00 
   Unbalanced panel rotation   -2.06  7.09 
   Cross section 1994  5.90  2.78 
   Cross section 2000  -22.65  4.26 
    
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 
 
                                                 
1 For young men, young women and adult women because censoring exceeds 50%  
2 Censored Least Absolute Deviation (CLAD) model with censoring at the median for men, CLAD with 
censoring at the third quartile (0.75)  for women. The standard errors are corrected by bootstrapping   21
All the above models fail a test for dynamic completeness
3, therefore we prefer a 
random effects rather than a pooled tobit, although the results do not differ 
significantly.  To further test the robustness, we also apply an unobserved effects tobit, 
as suggested by Wooldridge (2002).  This includes the mean of some dependent 
variables over the two periods to proxy unobserved effects, but the obtained results (not 
reported) are very similar.   Because there are little other tests available for the random 
effects tobit, we further investigate the robustness of our results by comparing them 
with those from the cross sections.  Again, none of the results are significantly different 
from those obtained from the balanced panel, as can be seen in Table 7.  
 
The above estimation methods have the shortcoming of not accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  To eliminate unobserved effects we estimate the difference model, 
represented by equation (1.17).  Table 8 reports the results of the OLS estimation.  
Since the models suffer from heteroscedasticity, we use the Hubert-White sandwich 
standard errors to test the significance of the coefficients.   
 
   Table 8: The added worker effect examined from the difference model (using actual labour supply) 
   
  Difference in actual labour 
supply (hrs/wk) 
 Young  women  Adult  Women 
    
The number of unemployed  young men in the household  0.44  -1.36 
    
The number of unemployed   adult men in the household  -4.99*  0.15 
    
The number of (other) unemployed   young women in the household  -1.66  1.30 
    
The number of (other) unemployed   adult women in the household  -13.43  2.76 
 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The results confirm that there is no added worker effect.  We only observe discouraged 
workers effects: young men work less when there are unemployed young women in the 
                                                 
3 Dynamic complete models have the property that the density of y conditional on x is independent of the 
past values of y and x.     22
household, while young women work less when there are adult unemployed men in the 
household.  It suggests that the other effects we observed above are due to unobserved 
heterogeneity.   
 
We obtain the same results when we restrict ourselves to the sub-sample of non-
negative values, which shows that an increase in labour supply is not related to changes 
in the number of unemployed in the household (results not reported).  
 
We conclude that, using actual labour supply, we find no evidence for an added worker 
effect of women as a response to the unemployment of other household members. 
 
 
6.  The added worker effect using desired labour force participation 
 
A valid criticism on most of the empirical literature of the added worker effect is that it 
is based on actual labour supply.  However, when unemployment is high, people may 
want to supply additional labour but be unable to do so.  In this section we investigate 
whether someone is more likely to have a desire to work when there are unemployed 
members in the household.  We only look at the labour market participation decision, 
and not at the number of hours, since we do not have information on the desired hours 
of labour supply. We rewrite equation (1.12) by introducing a binary variable Labour 











                 (1.18) 
 
We can estimate this equation by a probit latent variable model; we write: 
   23
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*












                 (1.20) 
 
Equation (1.19) can be written as:  
() ( )
*
01 2 3 1 1 3 Pr 1 .. ii i h i n n i LMP LMP w y u u v ββ β β β == = Φ + + + + + +           (1.21) 
 
Considering the same four categories of household members as before (young men, 
adult men, young women and adult women), we write  (1.21) as:  
()
*
01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 i i hi ym am yw aw i LMP w y u u u u v ββ β β β β β = Φ + + +++++          (1.22) 
   
Again we include the variables age, age squared and the number of young children in 
the household to make the model behave better.  We apply equation (1.22) to different 
parts of the data.  Table 9 gives an overview of the models we estimate.  
 
We estimate the model separately for young and adult women.  Note that we do not 
apply the fully differenced model, where both dependent and independent variables are 
differenced because in the case of a probit model, this does not eliminate the 
unobserved individual effects and therefore loses its attraction.  
4 
 
We focus on the results obtained from the balanced panel, which are reported in Table 
10. We observe that there is a positive association between young women’s desire to 
work and the number of other young women in the household who are unemployed.  
This suggests that young women are more likely to have a desire to work when their 
sisters are unemployed.   
                                                 
4 because  () ( ) ( )
*** ' ' '








    Table 9: Overview of the models estimated for the added worker effect based on desired labour force participation 
 
Name Model  Part of the data applied to Estimation  method 
(1) balanced panel  () ( ) 01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 Pr 1
it it it itym itam ityw itaw i LMP w y u u u u v ββ β β β β β == Φ + + + + + + +   :: 1 : 2 it t t t ∀ ∃= ∧ ∃=   Panel probit 
(2) panel with attrition  () ( ) 01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 Pr 1








(3) rotating panel   () ( ) 01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 Pr 1
it it it itym itam ityw itaw i LMP w y u u u u v ββ β β β β β == Φ + + + + + + +   :: 1 : 2
:: 1 2
it t t t
it t t
∀ ∃= ∨ ∃=
∧∃ ∃ = ∧ =  
 
Panel probit 
(4) cross section 1994  () ( ) 01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 Pr 1
it it it itym itam ityw itaw i LMP w y u u u u v ββ β β β β β == Φ + + + + + + +   :: 1 it t ∀ ∃=   Heteroscedastic 
probit 
(5) cross section 2000  () ( ) 01 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 Pr 1
it it it itym itam ityw itaw i LMP w y u u u u v ββ β β β β β == Φ + + + + + + +   :: 2 it t ∀ ∃=   Heteroscedastic 
probit 
     
Note 1: The balanced panel only contains the individuals coming from households that are present in both rounds; the panel with attrition contains only those individuals whose 
household was present in the first round; while in the rotated panel, the individuals from households who have left in the second round are replaced by individuals coming from 
similar households as those who have left. 
 
Note2:  For the panel data we prefer the random effects probit rather than the pooled probit because all models fail a test for dynamic completeness (Wooldridge 2002).  For models 
(4) – (6) we use a conditional moment test described by Pagan and Vella (1989) and find that the ordinary probit fails the heteroscedasticity or normality condition for in most cases.  
If this is the case we use a heteroscedastic probit where the variance is a function of the variable that causes heteroscedasticity.  However, in one case the results obtained in this way 




 Extent and causes of unemployment among young men in Africa  25 
Table 10: Balanced panel estimates using desired labour market participation 
  Desired  labour force participation 
  (1) (2) 
  Young women   Adult women 
Age 0.05995  -0.19026 
  (0.14325) (0.07669)* 
Age squared  -0.00216  0.00152 
  (0.00269) (0.00076)* 
The number of young unemployed men in the household  0.25169  -0.14007 
  (0.20628) (0.15398) 
The number of adult unemployed men in the household  0.44208  -0.08738 
  (0.32782) (0.27367) 
The number of (other) young unemployed women in the household  0.93836  -0.20144 
  (0.25255)**  (0.14184) 
The number of (other) adult unemployed men in the household  0.59762  0.68316 
  (0.61573) (0.49562) 
Shadow earnings  0.00276  0.00594 
  (0.00063)** (0.00093)** 
Value of assets per household member  -0.00004  -0.00004 
  (0.00003) (0.00005) 
Number of children under six  -0.43412  -0.30939 
  (0.12127)** (0.16255)+ 
Constant 0.71843  4.81440 
  (1.85540) (1.87888)* 
Observations 702  912 
Number of individuals  351  456 
Standard errors in parentheses     
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
    
 
 
However, it is unlikely that this should be interpreted as an added worker effect.   
Young women earn on average only slightly more than adult women, and are therefore 
probably not more likely than adult women to enter the labour force as an added 
worker.  Besides, young and adult men still earn more, so the added labour would be 
expected as a reaction to the unemployment of young or adult men rather than to the 
unemployment of other young women.  Since the majority of the unemployed are 
looking for work, the observed positive effect is likely to reflect that young women are 
more likely to have a desire to work when their sisters do so.  We conclude that we find 
no added worker effect when we use desired labour force participation. 
 
How robust are our results?  Because there are no tests available (yet) to test the 
assumption underlying the random effects probit 
20, we check the robustness of the 
coefficients first by using a slightly different estimation method and second by 
                                                 
20  The random effects probit relies on three assumptions (Wooldridge 2002): (1) the independent 
variables are strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved effects; (2) the dependent variables are, 
conditional on the independent variables and the unobserved effects, serially uncorrelated and (3) the 
random effects are normally distributed.      26 
 
comparing with the results obtained from applying the same model to other parts of the 
data.  A first comparison is with the results obtained from a different estimation 
method.  The panel probit is estimated by Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) 
method using a Gauss-Hermite quadrature approximation to the variance matrix (see 
Liang and Zeger 1986), we check whether other quadrature approximations give similar 
results.  The obtained results differ less than one point four percent (1.4%) indicating 
that the original results are robust.   
 
To further investigate the robustness of our results and to see whether our panel suffers 
from a selection bias, we compare it with the results obtained from the panel with 
attrition.  We find that none of the results are contradicted, as is clear from Table 11; 
although the figures suggest that there is a positive association between young women’s 
desire to work and the number of young unemployed men in the household.   To check 
the robustness of our results further, we apply the same model to the panel with 
rotation.   Again, none of the results obtained from the balanced panel are contradicted.  
Note that the coefficient reflecting the added worker effect of young women as a 
response to the unemployment of young men now has a higher significance.  This may 
be because the panel with attrition includes those households which were interviewed 
in wave one, but not in wave two.  Their dropping out of the sample is usually caused 
by migration. We also know that migration is mostly work related.  Therefore the panel 
with attrition is likely to contain more households with unemployed. This may explain 
the higher significance.  The higher significance of some coefficients in the rotated 
panel may be caused by the fact that new households are not exactly the same as the 
replaced ones.   
 
    27 
 
 
Table 11:  The added worker effect using desired labour market participation 





The number of unemployed young men in the household     
   Balanced panel  0.25  -0.14 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition   0.49**  -0.15 
   Unbalanced panel rotation  0.30*  -0.17 
   Cross section 1994  0.01  -0.13* 
   Cross section 2000  0.12  -0.11* 
    
The number of unemployed adult men in the household     
   Balanced panel  0.44  -0.09 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition   0.40  0.01 
   Unbalanced panel rotation  0.38  0.01 
   Cross section 1994  -0.01  0.03 
   Cross section 2000  0.18  0.09 
    
The number of (other) unemployed young women in the household     
   Balanced panel  0.94**  -0.20 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition   0.92**  -0.17 
   Unbalanced panel rotation  0.56**  -0.22 + 
   Cross section 1994  0.06  -0.13 
   Cross section 2000  0.17  -0.04 
    
The number of (other) unemployed adult women in the household     
   Balanced panel  0.60  0.68 
   Unbalanced panel with attrition   0.43  0.60 
   Unbalanced panel rotation  0.63+  0.58 
   Cross section 1994  0.05  0.17 
   Cross section 2000  0.50  0.19** 
    




The panel data models are all random effects since there is no method to estimate fixed 
effect probit models.  We test the models for dynamic completeness following 
Wooldridge (2002) and find that they all fail.  Therefore we do not report the results of 
the pooled probit models, even though in some cases correlation between the error 
terms of both periods is low, indicating that the pooled results are not significantly 
different from the random effect model.  Using a different quadrature method for the 
estimation yields similar results.  In all the cases the differences are small to very small.   
    28 
 
A final check on the robustness of the results is to compare them with the two cross 
sections.  We tested the cross section probit models for normality and homoscedasticity 
using a conditional moment test following Stewart (1999) and Pagan and Vella (1989).   
When the model fails homoscedasticity, we develop a heteroscedastic probit where the 
variance is a function of the variable that causes heteroscedasticity.   
 
Again none of the results from the balanced panel are contradicted.  In three cases the 
sign is different but the magnitude is small and the significance is very low.  In another 
three cases the cross section coefficients have a higher significance than those from the 
balanced panel.  The reason is that the cross section models suffer from heterogeneity 
in unobserved effects, while the random effect (panel) models allow for clustering of 
the unobserved effects around individuals.  
 
We conclude that we only find evidence for an association between young women’s 
desire to work and the number of other young unemployed women in the household.  
Given that young women are not primary workers, we cannot interpret this as reflecting 
an added worker effect.  We do not find any other evidence for the existence of an 
added worker effect using desired labour force participation.  
 
7.  Why do we not observe an added worker effect in the traditional sense? 
 
We have shown above that we do not observe an added worker, whether we use actual 
or desired labour supply.  As mentioned before, this is consistent with other research 
that finds a small or no added worker effect.   Since we also measured desired labour 
supply, we cconlcude that women do not want to supply additional labour as a response 
to unemployment within the household.      29 
 
In previous work we find suggestive evidence that households have other coping 
mechanisms to deal with unemployment [see Serneels (2003)].  We find that the 
unemployed young men come from households with a lower value of assets and 
consumption per household member.  This suggests that households cope with 
unemployment by using their savings (selling their assets), and cutting back on 
consumption, rather than by sending in secondary workers in the labour market.  Why 
do households use their savings and cut back their consumption instead of generating 
more income by supplying additional labour to the market?  The reason is that women’s 
earnings do not exceed the (shadow) cost of their household activities; therefore 
households do not (want to) supply additional female labour.  We can see two separate 
factors that cause the lower earnings of women. More analysis is needed to establish 
these facts fomally.  The first is that women earn less than men, in whatever job they 
are engaged.  Second, and more important, the labour market seems segmented in good 
and bad jobs, and women have a lower chance to get a good job.
 21  Because of the wide 
gap between earnings from a bad job and a good job (the latter is two and a half times 
the former), expected female earnings are too low to trigger off additional labour. 
 
8.  Limitations of the analysis  
 
We discuss two issues that are relevant for the interpretation of the above results.       
 
The concept of the household  
Throughout the analysis, we consider the household as a closed entity that does not 
change over time.   But, of course, households change.  The most relevant change is 
                                                 
21 A full proof of segmentation in the labour market is not obvious, as shown by Heckman and Salacek 
(1985) and Heckman and Hotz (1986).  Nevertheless, one can come to suggestive evedence, as argued by 
Dickens and Lang (1987) and Magnac (1991).  Although we do not test it formally, we also find 
suggestive evidence for segmentation in the labour market [see Serneels (2000)].    30 
 
that young people leave the household and start their own family.   This also depends 
on their employment status.   Young men especially are more likely to leave the 
household when they have work.  To put it differently, they are more likely to stay in 
the parental household as long as they are unemployed. Young women, on the other 
hand are more likely to stay in the parental household until they are married, 
independent of whether they have a job or not. Because our estimates are conditional on 
the presence of unemployed members in the household, the fact that they move out 
when working does not affect our results.   
 
Another important change in household composition is early death of one of the 
parents, as well as divorce.  We discussed in Section 3.   that thirty-seven percent of the 
households have a female household head.  In ninety percent of these female headed 
households there is no partner present.  This absence of an adult male primary worker 
may have triggered off entry into the labour force already.   It underlines that labour 




We have paid no attention to the issue of simultaneity.  The methodology we use to 
investigate the added worker effect does not enable us to draw conclusions on the 
direction of causation.  We cannot exclude that causation goes the other way around.  
Adult women may for example supply more labour so that their sons have more leisure.  
This may be because parents are happy to increase their own labour supply to improve 
the child’s wellbeing.
22 Or, if unemployment takes the form of queuing for a good job, 
                                                 
22 This is exactly what Becker hinted at with his Rotten Kids Theorem, where the preferences of one 
household member (the parent) depends on the wellbeing of another member (the kid).   In a dynamic    31 
 
it may be the case that the son’s unemployment is a household portfolio investment 
decision to optimize future income streams.   Mothers may anticipate this and supply 
additional labour.   In our case, we observe no simultaneous relationship. This suggests 
that there is also no effect of mother’s labour supply on the son’s unemployment.  We 
could investigate this further using an instrumental variable model.  However, the lack 
of valid instruments prohibits us from examining this. 
23   
 
9.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
We first look at the characteristics of the unemployed within the household and find 
that men are more likely to be unemployed than women, but once we control for being 
family-in-law, this effect becomes less significant.  The strong negative effect of being 
family-in-law and the strong positive effect of biological closeness to the household 
head indicate that the Ethiopian nuclear household does not adopt other unemployed 
members.  Since we consider urban households, this in itself provides counter evidence 
to the notion that rural people move to urban areas in order to search for work, while 
staying with family.  We find that older sons who remain in the household are more 
likely to be unemployed, but this may be due to self-selection. More importantly, we 
find no evidence that job aspirations of young men are related to their birth order.  
Elder daughters who remain in the household have lower job aspirations than their 
younger sisters, but this may also be the result of self-selection.   Our analysis also 
confirms earlier results that the unemployed come from households with low assets and 
consumption per household member.  
                                                                                                                                              
model children will anticipate their parent’s behaviour and will be less likely to supply labour themselves 
[see Gintis (2000)]. 
23 We find no satisfying instruments, i.e. variables that are correlated with unemployment of the primary 
worker, but not with labour supply of the secondary worker.     32 
 
In other work, we saw that the duration of unemployment in urban Ethiopia may be 
very long, namely close to four years.  The question arises how people cope with these 
long periods of unemployment. We investigate one such coping mechanism, the added 
worker effect.  This is defined as secondary workers supplying additional labour when 
the primary worker in the household becomes unemployed.  Because people may be 
willing but not able to supply more labour we use both actual and desired labour force 
participation.   
 
Using actual labour supply we find no evidence for an added worker effect.  This result 
is robust to different parts of the data.  A difference model, which eliminates 
unobserved individual effects, also gives the same result.   When using desired labour 
force participation, we also find no evidence for an added worker effect.  We do find a 
positive relationship between the number of (other) young unemployed women and the 
desire to work of young women, but argue that this is not an added worker effect, but 
rather a positive influence of the sister’s desire to work.   
 
The data also suggests that factors other than the number of unemployed household 
members are important determinants of female labour force participation.  Over one 
third of the households are female headed.  About half of the female heads of 
household are widowed, a fifth are separated or divorced.  These factors are important 
alternatives that trigger the woman’s entry in the labour market.   
 
We conclude that the added worker effect is no mechanism to cope with unemployment 
in the household.   Given the long periods of unemployment, which represent a 
substantial draw on the household’s resources, this suggests that the household uses 
other coping mechanisms.   One of them seems to be selling assets - the main source of 
saving; another is consumption smoothing.      33 
 
 
10.  Bibliography 
 
Ashenfelter, O. (1980). "Unemployment as disequilibrium in a model of aggregate 
labor supply." Econometrica 48: 547-64. 
  
Awudu, A. and R. P. Prasad (2000). "Estimating Labor Supply of Farm Households 
under Nonseparability: Empirical Evidence from Nepal." Agricultural Economics 
22(3): 309-20. 
   
Bardhan (1984). “Land, Labor and Rural Poverty: Essays in Development Economics.” 
New York, Columbia University Press. 
  
Bardhan, P. and C. Udry (1999). Development Microeconomics. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
  
Basu, K., G. Genicot, Stiglitz (1998). “Household Labor Supply, Unemployment and 
Minimum Wage Legislation.” World Bank Working Paper. 
  
Basu, K., A. Narayan, et al. (1999). “Is Knowledge Shared within Households?” 
  
Behrman, J. R. (1997). “Intrahousehold distribution and the family. Handbook of 
population and family economics. M. R. Rosenzweig and O.Stark. Amsterdam, North-
Holland Publishing Company.” 
  
Behrman, J. R. and A. B. Deolalikar (1993). "The Intrahousehold DIstribution of 
Market Labour Supply in Rural South India." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics 55(4): 409-420. 
  
Behrman, J. R. and P. Taubman (1986). "Birth Order, Schooling and Earnings." Jounal 
of Labor Economics 4(3): S121-S145. 
  
Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, et al. (1994). "Income and Outcomes: A structural 
Model of Intrahousehold Allocation." Journal of Political Economy 102(6): 1067-1096. 
  
Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). "Collective Labor Supply." Journal of Political Economy 
100(3): 437-467. 
  
Clain, S. H. and K. Leppel (1996). "Further Evidence of the Added Worker Effect 
among White Couples." De Economist 144(3): 473-86. 
  
Cooke, P. A. (1998). "Intrahousehold Labor Allocation Responses to Environmental 
Good Scarcity: A Case Study from the Hills of Nepal." Economic Development and 
Cultural Change. 
  
CSA (1987). 1984  “Census Report.” Addis Ababa, Central Statistical Authority. 
  
CSAE (1996). “Ethiopia Social Sector Review”, CSAE, Oxford. 
     34 
 
Dercon, S. and P. Krishnan (2000). "In Sickness and in Health ... Risk-Sharing within 
Household in Rural Ethiopia." Journal of Political Economy. 
  
Dickens, W. T. and K. Lang (1985). "A Test of Dual Labor Markets." American 
Economic Review 75(4): 792-805. 
  
Dickens, W. T. and K. Lang (1987). "A goodness of fit test of dual labor market 
theory." NBER working paper 2350. 
  
Dickens, W. T. and K. Lang (1988). "The Reemergence of Segmented Labor Market 
Theory." American Economic Review 78(2): 129-134. 
 
Dickens, W. T. and K. Lang (1996). "An Analysis of the Nature of Unemployment in 
Sri Lanka." Journal of Development Studies 31(4): 620-636. 
  
Duflo, E. and C. Udry (2001). “Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote d'Ivoire: 
Social Norm, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices.”mimeo 
  
Fafchamps, M. and A. R. Quisumbing (1999). “Social Roles, Human Capital and the 
Intrahousehold Division of Labor: Evidence from Pakistan.” 
  
Finegan, A. T. and R. A. Margo (1994). "Work Relief and the Labor Force 
Participation of Married Women in 1940." Journal of Economic History 54(1): 64-84. 
  
Fleisher, B. M. and G. Rhodes (1976). "Unemployment and the Labor Force 
Participation of Married Men and Women: A Simultaneous Model." Review of 
Economics and Statistics 58: 398-406. 
  
Flinn, C. J. and J. J. Heckmann (1983). "Are Unemployment and Out of the Labor 
Force Behaviorally Distinct Labor Force States?" Journal of Labor Economics 1(1): 28-
42. 
  
Glewwe, P. (1989). "Unemployment in Developing Countries: Economist's models in 
light of evidence from Sri Lanka." International Economic Journal 1(4): 1-17. 
  
Glewwe, P. and H. Jacoby (1992). “Estimating the Determinants of Cognitive 
Achievement in Low-Income Countries.” Washington, DC, The World Bank: 72. 
  
Greene, W. H. (1997). “Econometric Analysis.” New Jersey, Prentice-Hall. 
  
Gruber, J. and J. Cullen (1996). “Spousal Labor Supply As Insurance: Does 
Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out the Added Worker Effect?” NBER Working 
Paper. 
  
Haddad, L., J. Hoddinott, et al. "Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Developing 
Countries.". 
  
Haile, A. (1999). “The Nature and extent of unemployment in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian 
Economy, Performance and Evaluation”, Eighth Annual Conference on the Ethiopian 
Economy, Nazareth, Ethiopia, Ethiopian Economic Association, Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung. 
     35 
 
Heckman, J. J. and V. J. Hotz (1986). "An Investigation of the Labor Market Earnings 
of Panamanian Males - Evaluating the Sources of Inequality." Journal of Human 
Resources 21(4): 507-542. 
  
Heckman, J. J. and G. Sedlacek (1985). "Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and Market 
Wage Functions: An Empirical Model of Self-Selection in the Labor Market." Journal 
of Political Economy 93(6): 1077-1125. 
 
 
ILO (1990). “Youth Labour in Africa.” Addis Ababa, JASPA. 
  
Juster, T. F. and F. P. Stafford (1991). "The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings, 
Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement." Journal of Economic Literature 
29(2): 471-522. 
  
Kebede, B. (2001). “Intra-Household Distribution of Expenditures in Rural Ethiopia: A 
Demand Systems Approach.”, mimeo 
  
Khandker, S. R. (1988). "Determinants of Women's Time Allocation in Rural 
Bangladesh." Economic Devlopment and Cultural Change 37(1): 111-126. 
  
Killingsworth and J. Heckman (1986). “Labor Supply of Women.” In “Handbook of 
Labor Economics.” R. Layard and O. Ashenfelter, North Holland. Volume 1. 
  
Kimhi, A. and N. Sosner (2000). “Intrahousehold Allocation of Food in Southern 
Ethiopia.” mimeo 
  
Kingdon, G. and J. Knight (2001). “Unemployment in South Africa; the nature of the 
beast.” CSAE Working Paper, Centre for the Study of African Economies. 
  
Krishnan, P. (1996). "Family Background, education and employment in urban 
Ethiopia'." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 58 (1): 167-184. 
  
Krishnan, P. (1999). “Testing Models of wage determination in an urban labour 
market.”, CSAE Working Paper 
  
Krishnan, P., G. Selassie, et al. (1997). “The urban labour market during Structural 
Adjustment: Ethiopia 1990-1997”, Centre for the Study of African Economies Working 
Paper 
  
Layard, R., M. Barton, et al. (1980). "Married women's participation and hours." 
Economica 47: 51-72. 
  
Liang, K.-Y. and S. L. Zeger (1986). "Longitudinal Data Analysis Using Generalized 
Linear Models." Biometrika 73(1): 13-22. 
  
Ligon, E. (2001). “Dynamic Bargaining in Households (with an Application to 
Bangladesh)”, mimeo. 
  
Lloyd, C. B. and A. K. Blanc (1996). "Children's schooling in sub-Saharan Africa: The 
role of fathers, mothers, and others." Population and Development Review 22: 265-298. 
     36 
 
Lundberg, S. (1985). "The Added Worker Effect." Journal of Labor Economics 3(1): 
11-37. 
  
Maloney, T. (1991). "Unobserved Variables and the Elusive Added Worker-effect." 
Economica 58(230): 173-87. 
  
Maloney, T. J. (1987). "Employment Constraints and the Labor Supply of Married 
Women: A Reexamination of the Added Worker Effect." Journal of Human Resources 
22(1): 51-61. 
Magnac, T. (1991). "Segmented or Competitive Labor Markets." Econometrica 
1991(1): 165-187. 
  
Mincer (1962). “Labor force participation of married women: a study of labor supply.” 
in “Aspects in Labor Economics.” H. G. Lewis. Princeton, NY, Princeton University 
Press. 
  
Newman, J. L. and P. J. Gertler "Family Productivity, Labor Supply, and Welfare in a 
Low Income Country." The Journal of Human Resources 14(4): 989-1026. 
  
Pagan, A. and F. Vella (1989). "Diagnostic Tests for Models Based on Individual Data: 
A Survey." Journal of Applied Econometrics 4 (supplement): S29-59. 
  
Pencavel, J. (1986). “Labor Supply of Men: A survey”  in “Handbook of Labor 
Economics.” R. Layard and O. Ashenfelter, North Holland. Volume 1. 
  
Pissarides, C. A. (1990). “Equilibrium Unemployment Theory.” 
  
Pitt, M. M., M. R. Rosenzweig, et al. (1990). "Productivity, Health, and Inequality in 
the Intrahousehold Distribution of Food in Low-Income Countries." The American 
Economic Review 80(5): 1139-1156. 
  
Quisumbing, A. R. and J. Maluccio (2000). “Intrahousehold Allocation and the 
Distribution of Resources at Marriage: New Evidence from Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Ethiopia, and South Africa.” mimeo. 
  
Rama, M. (1999). “The Sri Lanka Unemployment Problem Revisited.” Washington 
DC, The World Bank, Development Research Group: 45. 
  
Richardson, J. (1997). "Can Active Labour Market Policy Work? Some Theoretical 
Considerations." London School of Economics Centre for Economic Performance 
Discussion Paper 331: 28. 
 
Rose, P., G. Yoseph, et al. (1997). “Gender and primary schooling in Ethiopia.” 
Brighton, IDS. 
  
Saint-Paul, G. (1996). “Dual Labor Markets”, MIT Press. 
  
Schmidt, P. and J. A. Strauss (1975). "The Prediction of Occupation Using Multiple 
Logit Models." International Economic Review 16: 471-486. 
  
Schultz, P. (199). "Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and 
Fertility." The Journal of Human Resources 15(4): 599-635.    37 
 
  
Serneels, P. (1998). “Young Female Labour Supply in Urban Ethiopia”, University of 
Warwick. 
 
Serneels, P.  (2002). “Why Do We Observe Non-negative Duration Dependence among 
Unemployed Young Men in Urban Ethiopia”, mimeo, part of Ph.D 
 
Serneels, P.  (2002). “The Nature of Unemployment among Young Men in Urban 
Ethiopia”, mimeo, part of Ph.D. 
 
Serneels, P.  (2002). “Unemployment in urban Ethiopia: Conclusion, Policy 
Recommendations and Comparison to other African Countries ”, chapter from PhD.    
  
Skoufias, E. (1993). "Labor market opportunities and intrafamily time allocation in 
rural households in South Asia." Journal of Development Economics 40(2): 277-310. 
  
Söderbom, M. (2001). “Conditional Moment Tests for Tobit and Probit in Stata.” 
mimeo. 
  
Spletzer, J. R. (1997). "Reexamining the Added Worker Effect." Economic Inquiry 
35(2): 417-27. 
  
Stata (1999). Stata Reference Manuals, Stata Press. 
  
Stewart, M. (1998). Micro-econometrics, course manual. 
  
Strauss, J. A. and D. Thomas (1995). “Human resources: empirical modeling of 
household and family decisions.”, in “Handbook for development economics.” T. N. 
Srinivasan and J. Behrman. Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
  
Tano, D. K. (1993). "The Added Worker Effect: A Causality Test." Economics Letters 
43(1): 111-17. 
  
Teal, F. (2000). “Employment and Unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Overview”, Centre for the Study of African Economies. 
  
Tenjo (1990). "Opportunities, Aspirations, and Urban Unemployment of Youth: The 
Case of Colombia." Economic Devlopment and Cultural Change: 733-761. 
  
Thomas, D. (1990). "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach." 
Journal of Human Resources 25: 635-664. 
  
Topel, R. H. and M. P. Ward (1992). "Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men." 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
  
Tunali, I. and R. Assaad (1992). "Market structure and spells of employment and 
unemployment: evidence from the construction sector in Egypt." Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 7: 339-367. 
  
Turnham, D. (1993). “Employment and Development.” Paris, OECD: 275. 
     38 
 
Udall, A. T. and S. Sinclair (1982). "The Luxury Unemployment Hypothesis: A 
Review of Recent Evidence." World Development. 
  
Udry, C. (1996). "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household." 
Journal of Political Economy 104(5): 1010-1046. 
  
UNICEF (1993). “Enfants et Femmes D'Ethiopie, Rapport de Situation”, UNICEF: 
231. 
  
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.” 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
  
World Bank (1994). “Ethiopia”, World Bank. 
 
World Bank (2000). “World Development Indicators.” 
  
Xiaodong, G. and A. v. Soest (1997). “Family Structure and Female Labour Supply in 
Mexico City.” Tilburg CentER Working Paper. Tilburg. 
 
    39 
 
11.  Appendix  
Construction of shadow earnings 
 
 
To obtain shadow earnings, we first distinguish four groups of occupations: civil 
servants, public enterprise employees, private enterprise employees and self-employed.  
The last group consists of own account workers, casual workers, co-operative and 
domestic workers.  People working for an international organization are considered to 
be civil servants.
24  Using a multinomial logit, we model occupational choice separately 
for men and women. Following Schmidt and Strauss (1975) we then predict the 
occupation for those not working (the unemployed and those engaged in housework).  
We compared different models and selected the model that performed best, i.e. led to 
the lowest number of wrong predictions for the working.  We then ran a separate wage 
equation for each occupational category and each gender (eight separate groups).  The 
earnings of the self-employed are obtained from a Cobb Douglas production function as 
described in Section 0 following. We explored different specifications of the earnings 
equation for each occupational category, and selected the one with the lowest prediction 
error.  This model is then used to predict shadow earnings for those individuals for 
whom there is no earnings data available (the unemployed and those engaged in 
housework).   
 
 
                                                 
24 We explored three different categorizations for occupation and found that this one fitted best; i.e. had 
the highest number of correct predictions of occupation for those working (more than 80% in all cases).      40 
 
Earnings of the self-employed 
 
The earnings of wage workers and casual workers are directly observed.  Not so for 
employers and the self-employed.  However, we can predict their earnings from a 
production function.  To model the returns to self-employment, we develop a Cobb-
Douglas production function.  We assume that labour is homogenous.  We ignore that 
there may be differences in returns to own and hired labour because for the majority of 
self-employed their business is a one man or family business. In its log-linear form and 
allowing for market imperfections by including control variables, the production 
function looks as follows: 
ii i i ya k lX α β =+ + +                       (1.23) 
where:  
yi = ln( monthly revenue) 
ki  = ln (value of the business) 
li  = ln ( number of people working in the business, including the 
manager) 
Xi = town and sector dummies, years of schooling and gender of the 
entrepreneur and whether he has another business 
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